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REPLY TO APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT CIT'S RESPONSE TO ISSUES IN
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RJW MEDIA COULD
NOT SHOW THAT CIT ACTED WITH MALICE AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
A.

The Court Failed to View the Circumstantial Evidence in a Light Most
Favorable to RJW Media.

RJW Media presented rather convincing circumstantial evidence to the trial court
that CIT knew or should have known that the Trustee's Sale would foreclose on CIT's
interest in the Property unless CIT formally opposed or set the sale aside.

That

circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,
must be read in favor of the non-moving party, which was RJW Media in this case. See
Pugh v. Dozzo-Hughes, 2005 UT App 203, «f 1, 112 P.3d 1247, see also West v. Thomson
Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179, 187 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Circumstantial evidence is

especially important where a subjective element such as malice is a factual issue at
summary judgment:
The subjective determination of whether a defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement may
be proved by inference, as it would be rare for a defendant to
admit such doubts. A court typically will infer actual malice
from objective facts. These facts should provide evidence of
negligence, motive, and intent such that an accumulation of
the evidence and appropriate inferences supports the
existence of actual malice.
West, 835 P.2d at 187. Indeed, even where a party's view of circumstantial facts might
not be viewed as ultimately persuasive on the issue of subjective knowledge, summary
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decided to ignore that Sale, allowing RJW Media to purchase the Property. (R. at 22223).

These facts suggest that CIT consciously elected to allow RJW Media to purchase

tl le I } ropert> i ut ic o n t e s t e d s> :> tl lat CI I • :• :)i il ::l till lereaf tei tl ireaten R J Vv Media's quiet
enjoyment through the use of a subsequent and invalid notice of sale, forcing RJ W IVILV.
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Here, as noted, there are no real disputes about pure facts'
but about the intention surrounding the conduct, the 'factual
conduct *!
I I ere, it is not exactly the 'meaning' of facts or
their consequences, but the issue is what intent existed in the
'mind' of an entity when a notice of default was filed.

2

(R. at 691).
These facts and inferences, which must be afforded to RJW Media at this stage,
legitimately support a factual determination that CIT knowingly and wrongfully recorded
its Notice of Default. The trial court was required to consider the facts in RJW Media's
favor, and was not to determine at summary judgment whether CIT's self-serving
testimony would be more persuasive than the circumstantial evidence at trial. Viewed in
the proper light, the facts, circumstances and reasonable inferences before the trial court
at summary judgment did not foreclose on the possibility of a finding of CIT acted with
malice at a trial on the merits. Accordingly, CIT was not entitled to summary judgment
on RJW Media's slander of title claim. See Lamb, 869 P.2d at 928.
B.

The Trial Court Improperly Invoked Anderson v. Liberty Lobby in
Order to Factually Weigh RJW Media's Evidence Prior to Trial.

The law in Utah is that evidence presented on summary judgment "may be used
only to determine whether an issue of material fact exists, not to determine whether one
party's case is less persuasive than another's or is not likely to succeed in a trial on the
merits." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993); see also
Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, ^ 24, 144 P.3d
261 ("summary judgment cannot be granted based on the credibility and weight of the
parties' respective evidence."). In other words, the moving party at summary judgment
must "foreclose the possibility of the existence of certain facts from which the jury
could" infer an element of the claim at issue. West, 835 P.2d at 188 (citing Adickes v.
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S.K Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)) (emphasis added). As a result, when evidence
viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party at summary judgment creates a
possibility that a fact-finder could side with the non-movant at trial, summary judgment
should not be granted. West, 835 P.2d at 187.
CIT argues that Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, All U.S. 242 (1986), supports the trial
court's decision to weigh RJW Media's evidence against CIT's own statement of its state
of mind. The trial court also cited to Anderson at length in its April 18 Ruling and Order
and used Anderson to allow weighing of evidence at the summary judgment stage. (See
R. at 686-88). It appears, however, that Anderson does not necessarily establish Utah's
Rule 56 standard of review. See, e.g., West, 835 P.2d at 189, n.ll (vacated on other
grounds by 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994)).

Because Utah courts have never adopted

Anderson ys indication that the trial court must weigh evidence at summary judgment,
both the trial court and CIT's reliance on Anderson is misguided. (See id.; see also Brief
of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 13-15). In fact, it appears that the trial court struggled
with Anderson ys gap in logic when it admitted, "while trial courts are admonished again
and again not to 'weigh' credibility or compare one affidavit to another, this process is
I

really a weighing to some extent...." (R. at 690).
In this case, RJW Media's slander of title claim is subject to the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the lowest such standard applicable in civil trials. See How arth v.
Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1973) (stating that plaintiffs bore the burden of
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proving their slander of title claim by "a preponderance of the evidence"). Anderson was
written to allow federal courts to heighten the summary judgment standard in those cases
that required the heightened "clear and convincing" burden of proof. See Anderson, All
U.S. at 247 ("Our inquiry is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
heightened evidentiary requirements ... need not be considered for the purposes of a
motion for summary judgment."). As a result, even if Anderson were binding authority
in Utah, it is unclear whether the Anderson Court's assessment of "merely colorable"
versus "significantly probative" evidence can apply to claims subject to a preponderance
of the evidence burden of proof.
The trial court and CIT both attempt to bolster their reliance upon Anderson by
pointing out that this case was set for a bench trial and the trial court would be the
eventual finder of fact. The trial court's April 18 Ruling and Order demonstrates its
confusion with the court's role at summary judgment:
The difficulty here [in discerning CIT's intent at
summary judgment] is compounded for two reasons: the
nature of the dispute and the identity of the trier of fact. ...
Again, here the court will be the trier of fact. It is not
NOW the trier of fact in this motion, but will be at trial. That
normally would not matter for the purposes of such a motion
but in this case the court believes it does matter.
(R. at 691-92 (emphasis added)). The trial court also indicated that it weighed RJW
Media's evidence for likelihood of success at trial:
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the court believes the evidence presented by plaintiff is
insufficient to merit the expense and time of a trial to repeat
that same evidence and attempt to show malice.
(R. at 694 (emphasis added)); and
the court does not believe plaintiffs evidence could amount
to the realistic probability that this court would find malice ...
by CIT.
(R. at 693 (emphasis added)). However, Utah law confirms that the judge's role at
summary judgment is the same regardless of the identity of the ultimate trier of fact, and
that weighing of evidence at summary judgment is always impermissible. See Ellsworth,
2006 UT App at ^ 24 (holding that, in a matter set for a bench trial, the trial court's
findings at summary judgment appeared to be findings of fact reached by weighing
evidence and assessing credibility, and therefore required a reversal of a grant of
summary judgment).
The fact that the trial court admittedly viewed its status as the ultimate fact-finder
to be a pertinent factor in its decision to grant summary judgment demonstrates ipso facto
that the court misunderstood its role at summary judgment and impermissibly weighed
evidence at that time. The trial court's impermissible weighing of evidence dictates that
this case must be remanded for a trial on the facts. See Lamb, 869 P.2d at 928 (evidence
presented pn summary judgment "may be used only to determine whether a material
issue of fact exists, not to determine whether one party's case is less persuasive than
another's or is not likely to succeed in a trial on the merits."). As a result, the trial court's
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grant of summary judgment should be vacated, and this matter should be remanded for a
trial on the merits.
II.

THE TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS PRESUMED VALID AS A MATTER OF
LAW AND CIT FILED ITS SLANDEROUS DOCUMENT PRIOR TO
REBUTTING THAT PRESUMPTION.
CIT argues that a legal presumption of a sale's validity does not constitute

evidence that the sale was in fact valid. (Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 11). But
the law in Utah states that unless and until evidence of a sale's nullity is produced, the
sale is legally presumed valid. Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 47, ]f 36, 86 P.3d 699;
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1159 (Utah 1987);
Occidential/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Hence, CIT was required to produce legitimate evidence of the RJW Media sale's nullity
before attempting to re-foreclose on the Property. Indeed, Occidential directs a party to
actually challenge a trustee's sale with evidence of a procedural irregularity in order to
set that sale aside: "A party may have an apparently valid trustee's sale set aside for
irregularity, want of notice, or fraud if there is evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption of its validity." Occidental 791 P.2d at 221. However, until evidence is
offered to the contrary and the sale is set aside, a trustee's sale is entitled to a
presumption of validity. Id.
These authorities demonstrate that CIT was required to attempt to set the RJW
Media Trustee's Sale aside before recording its own notice of sale.
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Public policy

similarly dictates that once a foreclosure sale occurs, disgruntled junior lienholders
should be barred from noticing up substitute foreclosure sales unless and until the first
sale is proven invalid. To allow junior leinholders to simply disregard a foreclosures sale
based on a perceived technical irregularity, without first setting the sale aside, would
open the door to substantial post-foreclosure confusion and insecurity in the mortgage
industry.
The presumed validity of RJW Media's Trustee's Sale should have protected RJW
Media from CIT's slanderous and damaging acts. CIT chose to unilaterally disregard the
presumption of validity and published ai} interest in the Property that CIT knew or should
have known was nonexistent. This forced RJW Media to obtain preliminary injunctive
relief in order to stop CIT's slanderous notice of sale, and the cost of that action
constituted foreseeable damage to RJW Media. Accordingly, summary judgment in
CIT's favor was inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons and authority cited supra and in RJW Media's Opening Brief,
RJW Media requests that this Court reverse the Summary Judgment granted to CIT in the
trial court's April 18, 2007 Ruling and Order, and remand this case to the district court
with instructions to allow RJW Media the opportunity to prove its factual case at trial
before a fact finder in open court.
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RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS-APPELLANT
I.

AMERICAN
FALLS
SUPPORTS
THE
TRIAL
COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT CIT WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO CONTEST THE
TRUSTEE'S SALE.
Relying on the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in American Falls Canal Sec.

Co. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412 (Utah 1989), the trial court correctly
determined that CIT waived its right to contest the Trustee's Sale in this case. In
American Falls, the Utah Supreme Court applied the theories of estoppel and waiver to
the non-judicial foreclosure of a trust deed, and established that in Utah, "a party
otherwise in position to object to a mortgage foreclosure sale may well be precluded from
doing so based on conduct sufficient to bring into operation the doctrines of waiver and
estoppel." Id. at 414. The Utah Supreme Court also explicitly recognized that "a
mortgagor may by acquiescence and failure to assert his rights at the proper time be
estopped to set up irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the
purchaser." Id. {quoting 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages § 861). The American Falls Court
then held that although waiver and estoppel are generally fact questions, if "the facts and
circumstances are admitted or clearly established and where only one inference may
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, ... waiver and estoppel become questions of
law." M a t 4 1 5 .
CIT does not demonstrate that the trial court's reliance on American Falls was
improper, and CIT does not distinguish the present case from American Falls in any
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meaningful way. It is undisputed that CIT had notice of the Trustee's Sale and that CIT
became aware of the Trustee's Sale's technical irregularity approximately two months
before the sale actually occurred.

(R. at 222-23).

CIT has even conceded that it

consciously refused to attend the Trustee's Sale because of the irregularity, but it did not
object to the Sale's validity before or after the Trustee's Sale occurred. (R. at 223).
Therefore, the facts underlying RJW Media's quiet title claim were undisputed and were
questions of law properly decided at summary judgment. Under American Falls, the trial
court correctly held that CIT was estopped from challenging the Trustee's Sale on the
basis of alleged technical defects admittedly known to CIT well before the Trustee's Sale
ever occurred. (R. at 510).
Contrary to CIT's argument, the theory of estoppel does not require that CIT had a
legal duty to act.

Rather, "[t]he cardinal principle of estoppel" is that "one who

knowingly and silently permits another to expend money on land, under a belief that he
has title, will not be permitted to set up his own right to the exclusion of the rights" of the
purchaser. American Falls, 115 P.2d at 414 {quoting 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages, § 861).
The undisputed facts demonstrate that CIT did precisely that which American Falls
forbids: CIT knowingly permitted RJW Media to go through the time and expense of
conducting the Trustee's Sale, CIT stood by while RJW Media purchased the Property at
the sale under the belief that it obtained clear and unencumbered title, and CIT thereafter
attempted to set up its own right to foreclose by claiming that the Sale was invalid. As a
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result, the trial court correctly concluded that CIT waived its right to contest the Trustee's
Sale when it knowingly stood silent and allowed the Sale to occur.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
TRUSTEE'S SALE WAS VALID.
A.

CONCLUDED

THAT

THE

Any Technical Irregularity in the Trustee's Sale was Insufficient to
Invalidate the Trustee's Sale.

CIT attempts to distinguish this case from those which have upheld a technically
irregular sale by stating that here, the trustee had no authority to conduct the sale.
However, as the trial court noted, CIT provided no support for its claim that a notice of
default is somehow different from the other statutory notice requirements of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (R. at 508-09). "The detailed procedural requirements for a
trustee's sale of real property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor." Occidental, 791
P.2d at 220. Additionally, "the statutes regulating nonjudicial sales of property secured
by trust deeds are intended to protect the interests of the trustor/debtor in having the
property sold at a fair price." Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). As a result, the "sufficiency of the notice or the validity of a subsequent sale will
not be affected by immaterial errors and mistakes if those objectives are met,"
Occidental 791 P.2d at 220, and "[t]he remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied
only in cases which reach unjust extremes." Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159.
A review of the case law demonstrates that all cases validating a technically
deficient foreclosure sale share similar facts: (1) a technical defect or a factual
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misunderstanding resulted before a sale occurred; (2) the defect was known to the party
later seeking to set the sale aside; and (3) the defect ultimately had no negative effect on
the sale sufficient to warrant setting the sale aside. See American Falls, 775 P.2d at 412
(upholding sale where the foreclosing party failed to recognize that its trust deed secured
less than the amount bid at the sale); Occidential, 791 P.2d at 221 (holding that failure to
properly notice sale could not invalidate the sale where all relevant parties received
adequate notice); Timm, 2003 UT 47 (holding that defects in notice did not invalidate sale
where actual notice was received); Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1158 (flaw in published notice
of sale did not invalidate trustee's sale). Those facts are readily apparent in this case as
well. CIT undisputedly had notice of the Trustee's Sale before it occurred, knew of the
technical defect but did not object to the Sale on that basis, and has provided no evidence
that the defect caused any harm or injustice. (See R. at 222-23).
Despite the fact that the statutory notice requirements are intended to shield the
property rights of a trustor and ensure that the interests of the trustor/debtor are protected
by having the property sold at a fair price, CIT has attempted to use the statutory
requirements for a trustee's sale as a sword to attack the sale and set it aside for CIT's
own gain. See Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1160. However, CIT does not suffer any injustice
by allowing the Trustee's Sale to stand, and as a result, the trial court correctly granted
RJW Media's motion for summary judgment quieting title to the Property in RJW Media.
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B,

CIT Failed to Produce Evidence that Bidding was Chilled or that
Pricing was Diluted by a Technical Defect

It is well settled in Utah that a party must do more than simply identify a technical
defect in a trustee's sale in order to invalidate the sale and have it set aside. "Defects in
the notice of foreclosure sale that will authorize the setting aside of the sale must be those
that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of price."
Concepts, 143 P.2d at 1159. As the trial court recognized, case law indicates that a party
seeking to set a trustee's sale aside must produce affirmative evidence of chilled bidding.
See id. ("Defendant's statement that the incorrect date had the potential to mislead
prospective bidders is insufficient to conclude that it in fact did."); Occidental, 791 P.2d
at 221 ("there was no evidence presented that the inaccurate description of the property
... had any chilling effect on the bidding or resulted in an inadequate bid.").

CIT

produced no such evidence. In contrast, RJW Media's trustee testified that he discussed
the Trustee's Sale with several potential bidders, and none of them mentioned the record
history of the Property or any defect in the Sale. (R. at 373-74). Put simply, CIT failed
to meet its burden of demonstrating that the defect in the Trustee's Sale caused any
chilling at all, much less a level of chilling that amounted to extreme injustice. See
Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159 ("The remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in
cases which reach unjust extremes.").
Even if the lack of a notice of default could have potentially chilled the bidding at
the Trustee's Sale, the price bid at the sale was adequate. CIT itself testified that the
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Property's market value at the time of the Trustee's Sale was "in the range of $2 million."
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i ur the reasons stated and authority cited supra and in RJ W Media's Opening
Brief, RJW Media respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Summary Judgment

in the trial court's September 22, 2006 Ruling and Order.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of November, 2007.
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